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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff-R espondent,
vs.
BRANDON LYNN WINKLER ,
Defendant- Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 47102-201 9
APPELLA NT'S REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HONORAB LE LYNN NORTON, DISTRICT JUDGE

David H. Leroy, ISB No. 1359
Leroy Law Office
P.O. Box 193
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 342-0000

Lawrence G. Wasden, ISB No. 3444
Attorney General, State ofldaho
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83 720
(208) 334-2400

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Responden t
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COMES NOW the Appellant Brandon Winkler by and through his attorney David H.
Leroy and for a reply to the Bri f of Respondent filed herein by the Office of th Attorney
General hereby resp nd and contends as follows:

I.
EXISTING IDAHO PRECEDENT DOES NOT QUITE ADDRESS THIS COURT SNEED
FOR A FIRST IMPRESSION RULING A TO THE EFFECT O A PARDON O

'GUILT'

Both the Appellant and the Respondent have appropriately cited and marshaled prior Idaho
case precedents which deal with penalty enhancement under Idaho Code ection 18-8005(9). The
Appellant concedes that the language of the statute propos sonly to examine whether a person has
pled guilty or been 'found guilty as th tests for additional culpability. Mr. Winkler falls into the
latter category with a felony DUI judgment entered in April 2006 fewer than 15 years ago. We also
acknowledge that the Court in State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22 319 P 3d 1191 (2014) held that the
judicial dismissal or withdrawal of a prior guilty plea under Idaho Code Section 19-2604(1) was
insufficient to take the earli r conviction outside the statutory enhancement inclusion. However that
and all other Idaho precedents fail to addres the effect of ex cutive elem ncy upon the nhancement
statute. The Winkler facts are thus deserving of a fresh and reason d examination as to what the
Idaho Constitution intended a pardon to be. Significantly thi ca

does not involve the cleansing

of earlier guilt' by subsequent judicial action affecting the prior judgm nt.
II.

THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE SHOULD MORE PECIFICALL Y EXERCISE ITS OWN
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY IF IT WI HES TO SUBJECT EXECUTIVE BRANCH
PARDON

TO THE EFFECT OF IDAHO CODE 18-8005(9)
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As noted in Appellant s Brief: 'Idaho Code 18-8005(9) does not expressly or impliedly limit
the pardon power of the Commission. (Brief page 6) If the effect of this executive clemency is
truly to absolve the guilt as this Court examined and suggested is possibl in State v. Craig 117
983 793 P 2d 215(1990) and State v. Deitz, 120 Idaho 775 819 P 2d 1155 (1991) then a

reaffirmation of that effect of executive clemency as to this issue is appropriate for confirmation.
The Appellant ha cited in his Op ning Brief a minority of ariou other states which accord
an executive pardon more dignity and greater absolution and cleansing effect than a judicial
dismissal receives under their enhancement statute . (Brief pages I 0-13) Exhibit "A" to the
Appellant's Brief prepared by the Parole Commission illustrates how infrequently pardons are
granted in Idaho. If they truly are complete and 'unconditional

this Court ought to adopt the

Craig and Deitz rule as other state have done. The current text of Section 18-8005 does not direct
otherwise

III.
UNLESS THE LEGISLAT URE ACTS THIS COURT SHOULD DEFER TO THE RARE AND
UNIQUE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIV E BRANCH AUTHORI TY TO INCLUDE
ENHANCE MENT AMONG THE PUNISHM ENT AND EFFECTS OF A FINDING OF

GUILT AB OLVED BY A PARDON
The Respondent concedes that a pardonrest or s the Appellant 'to the rights he enjoyed prior
to the commissio n of the crime.

(Brief of Respondent p5.) Thi is certainly comparable to the

condition of a Defendant who has won a dismissal of an earlier judgment through the Court system
which, per Idaho Code Section 19-2604(1) has the effect of restoring the defendant to his civil
rights. Appellant urges that a pardon both more and different however. The question in narrowest
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form before this Court is "Do s a defendant obtain a greater right to avoid enhancement when the
source of his restoration to full citizenship is an executive pardon instead of a judicial judgment?'

This Court has longstanding precedent about th interpretation of statutory language which
condemned earlier judicial dismissal cases to the strict ' finding of guile rule under Section 18-8005:
"The Court begins with the statute ' words giving thos word their plain
obvious and rational meaning' Gle11, supra at 156 ldaho 25 319 P 3d 1194

The ntirety of the language of the 18-8005(9) enhanc ment law is directed toward the
history, procedures trial or plea result and subsequent conduct of a defendant before a court and the
court toward a defendant. Its denial of relief applies de pite the form of the judgment or withheld
judgment. Th ultimate test is also toward a judicial focus: 'pleads guilty or' found guilty.
However nothing in the statutory language contemp]ates th effi ct

O'

or specifies the

outcome after the constitutional executive intervention of a pardon. As to Mr. Winkler, the silence
is deafening. Per th Idaho Constitution Article IV Section 7 under t th metes and bounds of the
'pardoning power:

'The legislature hall prescribe . . . . . . .

Her

as to the implications of the

Parole Board' s constitutional issuance of a certificate which acts to fulJy ' restore the Defendant s
civil rights' the statute is silent and the legislature unspoken. lf th plain words of 18-8005(8) are
strictly construed to apply to a prior judgment in whatever form and are dir cting the conduct of
subsequent judicial proceedings andjudg s, then this Court should distinguish those precedents from
Mr. Winkler s clemency.

In the absence of more specific legislative direction this

ourt hould do for pardons what

it has not done for the dismissal of judicial judgments. Sp cifically it should give ull and strict
effect to the restoration of civil rights from the pardoned act and not focus solely on the finding of
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guilt which preceded the pardon. If a conviction is erased by an e ecutive pardon unless the
legislature so says directly the State v. Barwick rule that a vacated con iction becomes 'a nullity
and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all" should apply to Mr. Winkler. Id 94 Idaho
139 143, 483 P2d 670 67 4 ( 1971) Th

01nmission on Pardons and Paroles has decreed, under the

direct authority of the Idaho Constitution which remains undiminished by any specifically worded
legislative limitation that Mr. Winkler's rights under the earlier conviction, are completely and
unconditionally" restored.
The 'right not to be enhanced based upon and arising from that crim which th executive
branch has pardoned hould reasonably be respected since the statut is not more inclusive.
This Court should honor that interpretation deem a Idaho Code Section 18-8005 (9)
enhancement to be one of the pot ntial penalties which is relieved ther by and demand that the
Legislature specify to the contrary if it wishes to do so.

IV.
CON LUSION
For the above reasons and arguments the Appellant requests this Court to reverse and
remand as to he District Com1 decision at issue herein .
Respectfully Submitted:
DATED This

.:!h\_ day of March

2020.

David H. Leroy
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

u ~'\.

\_day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct copy of
I hereby certify that on this __
the within instrument to:

Ada County Prosecutors Office
200 Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
email: acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
David H. Leroy
Defense Counsel
P.O. Box 193
Boise, Idaho 83 702
email: dave@dleroy.com
Scott E. Fouser
F ouser Law Offices
P.O. Box 606
Caldwell, Idaho 83606
sfouser@idaholawyerfouer.com
email: dave@dleroy.com
Davalee Davis, Executive Assistant
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